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Summary
For the past two decades, China has experienced strong, continuous economic growth.
At the same time, the number of motor vehicles in China has rapidly increased. As a
direct result of such a phenomenon, China has been registering significant increases in
air pollution. In spite of recent advances in air pollution control, it remains a serious
problem for China’s major cities, and constitutes an important issue in the agenda of its
policy makers. The object of this paper is to explore the use of cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) to evaluate and rank alternative policy scenarios regarding the control of air
pollution emitted by motor vehicles. The empirical analysis carried out relates
specifically to the Chinese context, over a twenty year period, from 2001 to 2020, and
focuses on emission changes of the following three principal pollutants: CO, HC and
NOx.
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In recent years, China has experienced continuous economic growth. Moreover, there has
been a substantial increase in the demand for transportation. The number of vehicles in
China has increased at an average annual rate of 15% since 1981. In 2002 and 2003, sales
of passenger cars increased by 50% and 75%, respectively. It is predicted that within two
years, China will be the world’s second-largest new car market. [1].
A direct result of the rapid growth  in vehicle numbers is the significant increase in air
pollution. In big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, it was coal combustion that
used to cause most air pollution;  today the chief source is heavy vehicle pollution. There
are three main characteristics of air pollution in China’s largest cities (i.e. cities with a
population of over two million) nowadays. First, over 50% of NOx is emitted from
vehicles in large cities. Second, CO exceeds the national standard in the most traffic
congested areas in most large cities. Third, there is a rising potential threat of
photochemical smog in large cities [2]. Consequently, controlling air pollution produced
by vehicles is now  near the top of the policy agenda of Chinese central and local
governments in the country’s larger cities.
The purpose of undertaking a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of air pollution produced by
vehicles is to apply hard economic reasoning based on an assessment of the efficient
allocation of scarce financial resources, aimed at pinpointing and ranking the most
effective strategies for controlling pollution. Today, many international policy institutes
conduct CBA to assess the relative degrees of efficiency of alternative measures to curb
vehicle emission pollution. The main purpose is to identify and assess the economic
significance of costs and benefits of unit reductions in pollutants for different vehicle
models with regard to the various (cleaner) air policy scenarios under consideration. In
the present analysis, we consider the direct costs and expenditure incurred with the use of
technological equipment and hardware applied to different vehicle models in order to
achieve given air quality standards. In addition, on the benefit side we consider the gains
in reduced oil consumption obtained from improved efficiency in different motor modelsas a direct result of adopting  the above mentioned hardware. Owing to lack of data, this
paper does not address other benefits such as health benefits in its cost-benefit analysis.
Before computing the cost and benefit of controlling vehicle pollution, some essential
data and assumptions should be first defined. These will be discussed in detail in the next
section.
2. Data and Basic Assumptions
2.1 Identification of the Different Vehicle Models and Respective Characteristics
MOBILE5 model, which is based upon the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
DOS-based Mobile5 emission factor model, is used to classify the different vehicle types
that will be under analysis in this paper (see Table 1). Because of the efficient control
scenario of motorcycles currently in China, it is not necessary for us to design an
alternative scenario to substitute the current one. [3] Therefore, we do not take the
motorcycle into consideration in this study.
Table 1: Classification of the vehicles
Type Motor Model
LDGV Gasoline-fueled light-duty vehicles
LDGT1 Gasoline-fueled light-duty trucks up to 6,ooo pounds
LDGT2 Gasoline-fueled light-duty trucks between 6,001 to 8,500 pounds
HDGV Gasoline-fueled heavy-duty trucks over 8,500 pounds
LDDT Diesel-fueled light-duty trucks
LDDV Diesel-fueled light-duty vehicles
HDDV Diesel-fueled heavy-duty vehicles over 8,500 pounds
Source: EPATable 2 shows the data on annual traveling mileage of motor vehicles in China. The
figures are based on the data from the Regulations on the Management of Motor Vehicles
drawn up by the China Transportation Police Bureau. For instance, the maximum
mileages of LDGVs is 500 000 km and the maximum life of LDGVs is 20 years.
Therefore the average annual mileage covered by LDGVs is 25 000 km.
Table 2: Average Travel Mileage (per year)
Vehicle Type LDGV LDGT1 LDGT2 HDGV LDDT LDDV HDDV
Km 25 000 22 500 20 000 20 000 15 000 15 000 20 000
Source: China Transportation Police Bureau
The unit of efficiency in fuel use is measured in terms of the reduction in oil consumption
per mile traveled. Fuel efficiency is the yardstick in assessing  the relative benefits of
alternative policy strategies. Table 3 gives average fuel economy for each vehicle type.
The data are based on the results obtained in the B-9-3 program, an investigation carried
out by Tsinghua University, China in 1997. [4] Based on the prices of gasoline and diesel
oil in China’s domestic market in 2003, we adopt 0.4 UD dollar/liter as the average price
of both gasoline and diesel. [5]
Table 3: Average Fuel Economy of Each Vehicle Type (L/100km)
Vehicle Type LDGV LDGT1 LDGT2 HDGV LDDT LDDV HDDV MC
Consumption 9 10.5 12.5 25 13 12 22 2.5
Source: B-9-3 Project
2.2 Identification of the alternative policy scenarios under consideration
 Our analysis considers three alternative policy scenarios, namely the standard, middle
and strict control scenarios. The standard scenario is based on the regulations of theEmission Standard for the Pollutants from Vehicles laid down in 1999 by the State
Environmental Protection Administration of China. [6] The middle scenario is based on
the second control plan of the Beijing Vehicle Exhaust Control Comprehensive Scenario
Design drawn up by the Beijing local government authority. [7] It is more stringent than
national standards because of the critical situation of vehicle pollution in Beijing and the
city’s importance as the capital of China. China has been chosen to host the 2008
Olympic Games and owing to the rapid growth in vehicle numbers, many environmental
experts are calling upon Beijing to implement stricter control scenarios. The strict
scenario in this paper is one of the practical design proposals put forward by the Beijing
Gasoline Oil Association. [8] Table 4 shows the details of each scenario.
Table 4: Three Scenarios for the Control of Emissions from New Vehicles
 Vehicle Models
Standard
Scenario   
EURO1 EURO2 EURO3 EURO4
LDGV, LDGT1 1/1/1999 1/1/2005  n.a.  n.a.
LDGT2, LDDT, LDDV 1/1/2000 1/1/2005  n.a.  n.a.
HDGV, HDDV 1/1/2000 1/1/2005  n.a.  n.a.
 
Middle
Scenario   
EURO1 EURO2 EURO3 EURO4
LDGV, LDGT1 1/1/1999 1/1/2003 1/1/2007  n.a.
LDGT2, LDDT, LDDV 1/1/2000 1/1/2003 1/1/2007  n.a.
HDGV, HDDV 1/1/2000 1/1/2003 1/1/2007  n.a.
  Strict Scenario   
EURO1 EURO2 EURO3 EURO4
LDGV, LDGT1 1/1/1999 1/1/2003 1/1/2005 1/1/2008
LDGT2, LDDT, LDDV 1/1/2000 1/1/2003 1/1/2005 1/1/2008
HDGV, HDDV 1/1/2000 1/1/2003 1/1/2005 1/1/2010
Source: State Environmental Protection Administration of China, China Energy Foundation and Beijing
Gasoline Oil Association.
As indicated in Table 4, China adopts the same vehicle pollution control standards as the
European Union. The Euro Emission Standards were introduced in Europe to
progressively reduce the amount of harmful pollutants, such as carbon monoxide,
hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides and particulates. In this context, Euro Emission Standards
were first introduced in Germany, on 1 October 1990, establishing that only low-emissioncommercial vehicles were allowed to register for road use. As the plan was to gradually
reduce pollutants, EURO1 and EURO2 limits came into effect on 1 Oct 1993 and 1 Oct
1996 respectively, lowering the amount of pollutants allowed in each limit. On Dec 1998,
the European Council of Environment Ministers reached an agreement on the final
EURO3 standard and also adopted EURO4 and EURO5 for the year 2005 and 2008.
Table 5 shows details of the standard limits of the three main pollutants under alternative
standards for different vehicle types.
Table 5: Standard Limits Applied for the Various Vehicles
Model Standard Limits
CO HC NOx
Cars EURO1 3.16 1.13**
g/km EURO2 2.2/1.0* 0.5/0.7/0.9***
EURO3 2.3/0.64 0.2 0.15/0.5
EURO4 1.0/0.5 0.1 0.08/0.25
Commercial EURO1 Class1 2.72 0.97 0.14
Vehicles Class2 5.17 1.4 0.19
g/km Class3 6.9 1.7 0.25
EURO2 Class1 2.2/1.0 0.5/0.7/0.9
Class2 4.0/1.25 0.6/1.0/1.3
Class3 5.0/1.5 0.7/1.2/1.6
EURO3 Class1 2.3/0.64 0.2/0.56 0.15/0.5
Class2 4.17/0.8 0.25/0.72 0.18/0.65
Class3 5.22/0.94 0.29/0.86 0.21/0.78
EURO4 Class1 1.0/0.5 0.1/0.3 0.08/0.25
Class2 1.81/0.63 0.13/0.39 0.1/0.33
Class3 2.27/0.74 0.15/0.46 0.11/0.39
Heavy Diesel EURO1 4.9 1.2 9
Motors g/km EURO2 4 1.1 7
EURO3 2.09/5.53 0.66/0.83 5.04/5.13
EURO4 2.76 0.41 2.56
Notes: 1. * indicates gasoline/diesel; ** indicates HC/HC+NOx; *** indicates gasoline/non-direct
         -ejection diesel/ direct-ejection diesel.
2. Class1: weight< 1305kg; class2: 1305kg<weight<1760kg: class3: weight>1760kg
Source: European Union2.3 Cost and Benefit Data of Different Technological Control Measures
The cost and benefit data of different Euro standards are obtained from the B-9-3 Project
and the current motor parts supply market. Table 8 shows the original data on the costs
and benefits of different vehicle models under different control standards. In this table,
the costs include the hardware cost, which is incurred by using new technology to match
the alternative standards and repair costs. The new technological equipments include
closed loop electronic control ejection, cold start triple catalytic converter, rarefaction
combustion, deoxidization catalytic converter under rarefaction conditions, oxidation
catalytic converter and so on. [9] All the hardware costs and repair cost together
constitute the total costs incurred during the whole cycle of emission pollutant treatment.
The benefit is obtained/gauged from the improvements in economy of fuel when adopting











LDGV EURO1 955 80 3%
EURO2 1075 80 3%
 EURO3 1500 80 5%
 EURO4 4500 90 10%
LDGT1 EURO1 955 80 3%
EURO2 1075 80 3%
 EURO3 1600 80 5%
 EURO4 5000 90 10%
LDGT2 EURO1 150 80 -3%
EURO2 1050 80 1%
 EURO3 1600 80 3%
 EURO4 2200 80 3%
LDDT EURO1 850 80 1%
EURO2 1175 80 3%
 EURO3 1750 80 3%
 EURO4 2500 90 5%
LDDV EURO1 955 80 1%
EURO2 1150 80 3%
 EURO3 1800 80 3%
 EURO4 3100 90 5%
HDGV EURO1 528 38 -3%
EURO2 1352 90 3%
 EURO3 2100 90 3%
 EURO4 2750 90 5%
HDDV EURO1 1125 95 1%
EURO2 1425 95 3%
 EURO3 2200 95 3%
 EURO4 3885 100 1%
Source: B-9-3 Project and http://www.auto1688.com.cn/
3. Theoretical Approach of the Computing Method
3.1 Basic Formula
The aim of the computing method is to calculate the net benefit of emission reduction of
different pollutants in the middle and upper scenarios, so the basic formula is:( ) ( ) ( )
i j j i j E NB B N ∆ ∆ = /                            (1)
Because NB=B-C, We can rewrite the formula into Eq. (2):
( ) ( ) ( )
i j j j i j E C B B N ∆ − ∆ = /                         (2)
Where, i=1, 2, 3 presents the three different pollutants, CO, HC and NOx, respectively;
 j=1, 2 presents the Middle and Strict scenarios, respectively;
j C  is the total cost of a scenario;
j B  is the total benefit of a scenario
( )
i j B N  is the net benefit per ton for one pollutant;
( ) j NB ∆  is the difference between the net benefit of the current scenario (Middle
or Strict) and the standard scenario;
( )
i j E ∆  is the difference in the emission of one pollutant between the current
scenario (Middle or Strict) and the standard scenario.
3.2 Calculation of  ( )
i j NB ∆
( )
i j NB ∆  measures the welfare change associated with the adoption of a stricter pollution
emission policy. In other words, it refers to the change in the net benefits from moving
from the current (standard) scenario towards the middle or strict scenario. Therefore, it is
equal to the difference between the two net benefits of two different scenarios. In this
paper, the net benefit of a scenario, NB, is the economic benefit of oil,  oil B , less the sum
of the hardware cost,  h C , and repair costs,  r C . As given by Eq. (3)                            ) ( r h oil C C B NB + − =                       (3)
Considering the fact that NB=-NC, we can rewrite Eq (3) into Eq (4):
                          oil r h B C C NB NC − + = − =                     (4)
The hardware cost of a scenario, h C , is based on the accumulated data from the standards
for different years. For simplicity sake, we assume that the hardware cost is
smoothly/uniformly allocated throughout the life cycle of 20 years. The repair costs for a
scenario,  r C , is based on the accumulated data from the standards in different years. Each
repair cost is equally distributed across the life cycle of 20 years. Contrariwise, the
economic oil,  oil B , is based on the consumption of oil every one hundred kilometers and
the yearly mileage, multiplied by the improved percentage in oil economy and the
average oil prices for 2003. Thus, the total economic benefit of oil in a scenario will be
equal to the sum of the whole fuel economy improvement for each year.
3.3 Calculation of  ( )
i j E ∆
In order to obtain  ( )
i j E ∆ , we must calculate pollutant emission, E, first. The computation
of  E  is based on each control scenario and the emission factors. It is obtained by
accumulating the multiplication of the emission factor k (refer to Table 5), and annual
traveling mileage, L (refer to Table 2), through the twenty year long life cycle of the






n n L k E ,  (n is the year number)               (5) Using the calculated values of the pollutant emission  ( )
i j E ∆  we can obtain Eq. (6),
( ) ()( )
i j i i j E E E − = ∆ 0                             (6)
Where () i E0  is the emission of one pollutant under the Standard Scenario;
            ( )
i j E  is the emission of one pollutant under the current scenario (Middle or
Upper)
For example, in the Standard Scenario, cars will comply to EURO1 standards from 2000
to 2004, and comply to EURO2 from 2005 to 2020, so the emission during 2000 and
2004 is computed by multiplying EURO1 emission standards and annual traveling
mileage, while the emission during 2004 and 2020 is computed by EURO2 emission




The estimation of the cost benefit results involved the use of (a) six motor models, (b)
two control policy scenarios, and (c) three types of pollutants. Furthermore, alternative
policy scenarios have different effects on the discharge and cost / benefit of CO, HC, and
NOx treatment , because they register different values in the data on pollutants. Valuation
results are presented and discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. Table 7 shows
the emission of different vehicle models under each control scenario. Accordingly , we
can calculate the percentage changes of reduction in CO, HC, and NOx comparing
Middle and Strict scenarios with the Standard scenario, without considering cost and
benefit.Table 7: Comparison of the Discharge of Different VehicleTypes (Ton)
Vehicle Model Scenario CO HC NOx
LDGV Standard 1.73 0.93 0.41
 Middle 1.25 0.76 0.31
Strict 0.93 0.61 0.24
LDGT1 Standard 1.18 0.62 0.32
Middle 1.03 0.47 0.21
Strict 0.82 0.31 0.18
LDGT2 Standard 1.73 0.93 0.41
Middle 1.35 0.74 0.31
Strict 1.02 0.53 0.24
HDGV Standard 2.35 0.86 0.63
Middle 2.02 0.72 0.47
Strict 1.43 0.64 0.28
LDDV Standard 0.71 0.39 0.31
Middle 0.62 0.17 0.23
Strict 0.51 0.12 0.17
LDDT Standard 1.21 0.72 0.41
Middle 0.93 0.48 0.31
Strict 0.67 0.33 0.22
HDDV Standard 0.73 0.53 2.72
Middle 0.61 0.37 2.47
Strict 0.47 0.17 1.73
For instance, as shown in Figure 1, for gasoline driven light vehicles, if we adopt the
Middle scenario, the percentage changes in the reduction of CO, HC, and NOx emissions
are 27%, 18%, and 23% respectively; if we adopt the Strict scenario, the percentage
changes in the reduction of CO, HC, and NOx are 46%, 35% and 41% respectively. From
the calculations of the percentage change in the reduction of CO, HC and NOx, we can
rank the seven vehicle models from the results. That is: for LDGV, LDGT1, and HDGV,
the efficiency in controlling emissions of the three pollutants under both Middle and
Strict scenarios is CO, NOx and HC in descending order. For LDGT2 and HDDV, the
efficiency in controlling emissions of the three pollutants in both the Middle and Strict
scenarios is CO, HC and NOx in descending order. Finally, for LDDV and LDDT
vehicles, the efficiency of controlling emissions of the three pollutants under both Middle
and Strict scenarios is HC, NOx and CO, again in descending order.Figure 1: Emission Comparison of LDGV



























St andar d 
M i ddl e 
St r i ct  
4.2 Cost Benefits Results
Taking into account the data on cost and benefits, we can calculate the net benefit of CO,
HC, and NOx in the different control scenarios for different vehicle models. Because the
net benefits are all negative, all the figures in Table 8 refer to the net costs.Table 8: Net Benefit under Each Scenario of Various Vehicles (Dollar/Ton)
Vehicle models Scenario CO HC Nox
LDGV Middle 191 191 352
 Strict 270 621 1114
LDGT1 Middle 383 1203 3180
 Strict 5213 6314 10713
LDGT2 Middle 138 341 367
 Strict 1171 2050 4729
HDGV Middle 301 647 503
 Strict 107 410 268
LDDV Middle 372 189 379
 Strict 4003 2905 5370
LDDT Middle 201 187 411
 Strict 1671 2801 4002
HDDV Middle 760 563 310
  Strict 345 321 102
The results in Table 8 may be influenced by some variables such as yearly mileage, fuel
consumption rate, changing percentage in oil economy , oil price and discount rate.
The yearly mileage can influence the total amounts of emission but make little difference
on the net benefit. The oil price and the fuel consumption rate can influence the total
benefit. The bigger the discount rate is, the smaller the conversion rate of the cost and the
larger the  total cost. The changing percentage of economy in oil consumption is very
important in this analysis. The greater the percentage , the less time will be needed to
absorb the hardware cost and thus achieve better results in cost benefit. This also
indicates that  economizing on oil is of great importance in controlling emissions.
5. Conclusions
From the preceding calculations and results, we can rank the alternative control scenarios,









It is clear that for light duty vehicles, it is better to opt for the middle scenario. The reason
is that these vehicles are already controlled strictly under the standard scenario, therefore
if we follow the strict scenario, the costs of the unit pollutant are higher than they would
be in the middle scenario. This can also tell us that when standard emission levels reach a
certain rate , it is more difficult to further reduce  polluting emissions Additional
investments would be required to achieve this. For heavy duty vehicles, it is better to
choose the strict scenario. Because these vehicles are less controlled under the standard
scenario, this can make their control costs per unit discharge in the strict scenario lower
than those of the middle scenario, so the strict scenario can bring them more cost
benefits. Finally, comparing Table 7 and Table 9, we find that the amount of control over
emissions among different vehicle models differs according to the pollution control
measure implemented. For instance, for the LDGV, the strict scenario is more effective in
reducing the amount of pollutants than the middle scenario. However, from an economic
perspective, the strict scenario is not the preferred one since the cost-benefit exercise
shows that the net benefit estimates associated to the middle policy scenario are larger
compared to the net benefit estimates associated with the strict policy scenario.References
1.  A Survey of Business in China, The Economist, March 20th, 2004
2.  China State Environmental Administration Bureau, China Environmental reports
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001
3.  GB14622-2002 and GB 18176-2002, State Environmental Protection Administration,
website http://www.zhb.gov.cn
4.  World Bank. 2000a. Study on Urban Transport Development—Final Report
5.  China Information, 2004/1/19
6.  GB14761-1993, State Environmental Protection Administration
7.  He Kebin and Cheng Chang, 1999, Present and Future Pollution from Urban
Transport in China, China Environmental Series, Issue 3
8.  Beijing Technology, website www.bast.cn.net/zjjy/b20822-01.htm
9.  China Motor Vehicle Emission Control, The Energy Foundation, November 2001
10. European Emission Standards website:
http://www.dieselnet.com/standards/eu/hd.html and
http://www.dieselnet.com/standars/eu/ld.html
11. Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 15(6): 1987
12. Beijing Statistical Bureau. 1980-2002. Beijing Statistical Yearbook 1980-2001.
Beijing:  China Statistics Press
13. Development Research Center of the State Council. 2002. China Economic Times.
2002
14. Hao Jieming and Fu Lixin 2001, Urban Motor Vehicle Pollution Control, China
Environmental Publishing House
15. He Chongren, 1996, The Status and Perspective of Automobile Emission Pollution
Control, Shanghai Environmental Science, Vol. 15, No. 8, pp 11-13
16. LU Hua-pu,Yuan Hong, Wang Jian-wei. 2000. A Study on Traffic Congestion
Countermeasures in Beijing. Beijing, Beijing University Press
17. National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), National Environmental
QualityReport, 1996-2000 (NEPA, Beijing,!2001)18. Shanghai Statistical Bureau. 2002. Shanghai statistical yearbook 2001. Beijing: China
Statistics Press
19. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 2001. Mobility 2001
20. World Bank. 2000a. Study on Urban Transport Development—Final Report
21. World Bank-Asian Consultation Workshop. 2000b. World Bank’s Urban Transport
Strategy Review
22. China Statistical website http://ww.stats.gov.cn
23. Pollution Control in the PRC: Air Pollution Page : http://www.chinaenvironment.comNOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html
http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004
IEM 1.2004 Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB: Empirical Analysis of National Income and
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
ETA 2.2004 Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries
PRA 3.2004 Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy
ETA 4.2004 Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union
ETA 5.2004 Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy
CCMP 6.2004 Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal
PRA 7.2004 Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms
PRA 8.2004 Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a
When-Issued Market
PRA 9.2004 Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets
PRA 10.2004 Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions
PRA 11.2004 Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders
PRA 12.2004 Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values
PRA 13.2004 Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices
PRA 14.2004 Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
PRA 15.2004 Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
PRA 16.2004 Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions
CCMP 17.2004 Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade
NRM 18.2004 Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth:
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamics
SIEV 19.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice
NRM 20.2004 Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of
Differentiated Oligopoly
NRM 21.2004 Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists
NRM 22.2004
Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii):
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development
NRM 23.2004 Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based
Resources in Kenya
NRM 24.2004 Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare
NRM 25.2004 Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies
NRM 26.2004 Juan Luis EUGENIO-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach
NRM 27.2004 Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports
CSRM 28.2004 Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework
NRM 29.2004 Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation:
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest
NRM 30.2004
Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting
CCMP 31.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy
CCMP 32.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy
CTN 33.2004 Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
KTHC 34.2004 Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence
from US Cities
KTHC 35.2004 Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris ComparisonKTHC 36.2004 Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context
KTHC 37.2004 Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome,
Naples and Bari
KTHC 38.2004 Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm
ETA 39.2004 Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
PRA 40.2004 Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental
Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter?
CCMP 41.2004 Micheal FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems
KTHC 42.2004 Francesco CRESPI: Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective Analysis
CTN 43.2004 Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
CTN 44.2004 Marc ESCRIHUELA-VILLAR: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
NRM 45.2004 Sebastian BERVOETS and Nicolas GRAVEL (lxvi): Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity:
An Axiomatic Approach
NRM 46.2004 Signe ANTHON and Bo JELLESMARK THORSEN (lxvi):  Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric
Information on Private Environmental Benefits
NRM 47.2004 John MBURU (lxvi): Wildlife Conservation and Management in Kenya: Towards a Co-management Approach
NRM 48.2004 Ekin BIROL, Ágnes GYOVAI  and Melinda SMALE (lxvi): Using a Choice Experiment to Value Agricultural
Biodiversity on Hungarian Small Farms: Agri-Environmental Policies in a Transition al Economy
CCMP 49.2004 Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows,
Competitiveness Effects
GG 50.2004 Scott BARRETT and Michael HOEL: Optimal Disease Eradication
CTN 51.2004 Dinko DIMITROV, Peter BORM, Ruud HENDRICKX and Shao CHIN SUNG: Simple Priorities and Core
Stability in Hedonic Games
SIEV 52.2004 Francesco RICCI: Channels of Transmission of Environmental Policy to Economic Growth: A Survey of the
Theory
SIEV 53.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Maureen CROPPER, Alan KRUPNICK and Nathalie B. SIMON: Willingness to Pay for
Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency Matter?
NRM 54.2004
Ingo BRÄUER and Rainer MARGGRAF (lxvi):  Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity
Conservation: An Integrated Hydrological and Economic Model to Value the Enhanced Nitrogen Retention in
Renaturated Streams
NRM 55.2004 Timo GOESCHL and  Tun LIN (lxvi): Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and
Regulatory Choices
NRM 56.2004 Tom DEDEURWAERDERE (lxvi): Bioprospection: From the Economics of Contracts to Reflexive Governance
CCMP 57.2004 Katrin REHDANZ  and David MADDISON: The Amenity Value of Climate to German Households
CCMP 58.2004
Koen SMEKENS and Bob VAN DER ZWAAN: Environmental Externalities of Geological Carbon Sequestration
Effects on Energy Scenarios
NRM 59.2004 Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxvii): Using Data Envelopment
Analysis to Evaluate Environmentally Conscious Tourism Management
NRM 60.2004 Timo GOESCHL and Danilo CAMARGO IGLIORI (lxvi):Property Rights Conservation and Development: An
Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon
CCMP 61.2004 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO:  Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a
Technology-based Climate Protocol
NRM 62.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S.
NRM 63.2004
Györgyi BELA, György PATAKI, Melinda SMALE and Mariann HAJDÚ (lxvi): Conserving Crop Genetic
Resources on Smallholder Farms in Hungary: Institutional Analysis
NRM 64.2004 E.C.M. RUIJGROK and E.E.M. NILLESEN (lxvi): The Socio-Economic Value of Natural Riverbanks in the
Netherlands
NRM 65.2004 E.C.M. RUIJGROK (lxvi): Reducing Acidification: The Benefits of Increased Nature Quality. Investigating the
Possibilities of the Contingent Valuation Method
ETA 66.2004 Giannis VARDAS and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS: Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings
GG 67.2004 Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Constadina PASSA: Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary
Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach
GG 68.2004 Michael FINUS: Modesty Pays: Sometimes!
NRM 69.2004
Trond BJØRNDAL and Ana BRASÃO: The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy
Implications
CTN 70.2004 Alejandro CAPARRÓS, Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI and Tarik TAZDAÏT: On Coalition Formation with
Heterogeneous Agents
IEM 71.2004 Massimo GIOVANNINI, Margherita GRASSO, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Conditional
Correlations in the Returns on Oil Companies Stock Prices and Their Determinants
IEM 72.2004 Alessandro LANZA,  Matteo MANERA and Michael MCALEER: Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations
in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns
SIEV 73.2004 Margarita GENIUS and Elisabetta STRAZZERA: The Copula Approach to Sample Selection Modelling:
An Application to the Recreational Value of ForestsCCMP 74.2004 Rob DELLINK and Ekko van IERLAND: Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General
Equilibrium Assessment
ETA 75.2004 Rosella LEVAGGI and Michele MORETTO: Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different
Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach
CTN 76.2004 Salvador BARBERÀ and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in
a Heterogeneous Union
CTN 77.2004 Àlex ARENAS, Antonio CABRALES, Albert DÍAZ-GUILERA, Roger GUIMERÀ and Fernando VEGA-
REDONDO (lxx): Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion
CTN 78.2004 Francis BLOCH and Armando GOMES (lxx): Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
CTN 79.2004 Rabah AMIR, Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Licun XUE (lxx): Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency
Gains
CTN 80.2004 Francis BLOCH and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players
CTN 81.2004 Daniel DIERMEIER, Hülya ERASLAN and Antonio MERLO (lxx): Bicameralism and Government Formation
CTN 82.2004 Rod GARRATT, James E. PARCO, Cheng-ZHONG QIN and Amnon RAPOPORT (lxx): Potential Maximization
and Coalition Government Formation
CTN 83.2004 Kfir ELIAZ, Debraj RAY and Ronny RAZIN (lxx): Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement
CTN 84.2004 Sanjeev GOYAL, Marco van der LEIJ and José Luis MORAGA-GONZÁLEZ (lxx): Economics: An Emerging
Small World?
CTN 85.2004 Edward CARTWRIGHT (lxx): Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players
IEM 86.2004 Finn R. FØRSUND and Michael HOEL: Properties of a Non-Competitive Electricity Market Dominated by
Hydroelectric Power
KTHC 87.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Investment and Long-Term Income
CCMP 88.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI and Claudia KEMFERT: Interactions between Climate and Trade Policies: A Survey
IEM 89.2004 A. MARKANDYA, S. PEDROSO  and D. STREIMIKIENE: Energy Efficiency in Transition Economies: Is There
Convergence Towards the EU Average?
GG 90.2004 Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL : Climate Agreements and Technology Policy
PRA 91.2004 Sergei IZMALKOV (lxv): Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction
KTHC 92.2004 Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI: Cities and Cultures
KTHC 93.2004 Massimo DEL GATTO:  Agglomeration, Integration, and Territorial Authority Scale in a System of Trading
Cities. Centralisation versus devolution
CCMP 94.2004 Pierre-André JOUVET, Philippe MICHEL and Gilles ROTILLON: Equilibrium with a Market of Permits
CCMP 95.2004 Bob van der ZWAAN  and Reyer GERLAGH:  Climate Uncertainty and the Necessity to Transform Global
Energy Supply
CCMP 96.2004 Francesco BOSELLO, Marco LAZZARIN, Roberto ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL: Economy-Wide Estimates of
the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise
CTN 97.2004 Gustavo BERGANTIÑOS and  Juan J. VIDAL-PUGA: Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through
the Canonical Form
CTN 98.2004 Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of
Proportional Representation
GG 99.2004 Hans-Peter WEIKARD, Michael FINUS and Juan-Carlos ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA: The Impact of Surplus
Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements
SIEV 100.2004 Chiara M. TRAVISI and Peter NIJKAMP: Willingness to Pay for Agricultural Environmental Safety: Evidence
from a Survey of Milan, Italy, Residents
SIEV 101.2004 Chiara M. TRAVISI, Raymond J. G. M. FLORAX and Peter NIJKAMP: A Meta-Analysis of the Willingness to
Pay for Reductions in Pesticide Risk Exposure
NRM 102.2004 Valentina BOSETTI and David TOMBERLIN: Real Options Analysis of Fishing Fleet Dynamics: A Test
CCMP 103.2004 Alessandra GORIA e Gretel GAMBARELLI: Economic Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts and Adaptability
in Italy
PRA 104.2004 Massimo FLORIO and Mara GRASSENI: The Missing Shock: The Macroeconomic Impact of British
Privatisation
PRA 105.2004 John BENNETT, Saul ESTRIN, James MAW and Giovanni URGA: Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth
in Transition Economies
PRA 106.2004 Kira BÖRNER: The Political Economy of Privatization: Why Do Governments Want Reforms?
PRA 107.2004 Pehr-Johan NORBÄCK and Lars PERSSON: Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets
SIEV 108.2004
Angela GRANZOTTO, Fabio PRANOVI, Simone LIBRALATO, Patrizia TORRICELLI and Danilo
MAINARDI: Comparison between Artisanal Fishery and Manila Clam Harvesting in the Venice Lagoon by
Using Ecosystem Indicators: An Ecological Economics Perspective
CTN 109.2004 Somdeb LAHIRI:  The Cooperative Theory of Two Sided Matching Problems: A Re-examination of  Some
Results
NRM 110.2004 Giuseppe DI VITA: Natural Resources Dynamics: Another Look
SIEV 111.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Alistair HUNT and Anil MARKANDYA: Willingness to Pay to Reduce Mortality Risks:
Evidence from a Three-Country Contingent Valuation Study
KTHC 112.2004 Valeria PAPPONETTI and  Dino PINELLI: Scientific Advice to Public Policy-Making
SIEV 113.2004 Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Laura ONOFRI: The Economics of Warm Glow: A Note on Consumer’s Behavior
and Public Policy Implications
IEM 114.2004 Patrick CAYRADE: Investments in Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Infrastructure What is the Impact
on the Security of Supply?
IEM 115.2004 Valeria COSTANTINI and Francesco GRACCEVA:  Oil Security. Short- and Long-Term PoliciesIEM 116.2004 Valeria COSTANTINI and Francesco GRACCEVA:  Social Costs of Energy Disruptions
IEM 117.2004
Christian EGENHOFER, Kyriakos GIALOGLOU, Giacomo LUCIANI, Maroeska BOOTS, Martin SCHEEPERS,
Valeria COSTANTINI, Francesco GRACCEVA, Anil MARKANDYA and Giorgio VICINI: Market-Based Options
for Security of Energy Supply
IEM 118.2004 David FISK: Transport Energy Security. The Unseen Risk?
IEM 119.2004 Giacomo LUCIANI: Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets. What is it and What is it not?
IEM 120.2004 L.J. de VRIES and R.A. HAKVOORT: The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets
KTHC 121.2004 Alberto PETRUCCI: Asset Accumulation, Fertility Choice and Nondegenerate Dynamics in a Small Open
Economy
NRM 122.2004 Carlo GIUPPONI, Jaroslaw MYSIAK and Anita FASSIO: An Integrated Assessment Framework for Water
Resources Management: A DSS Tool and a Pilot Study Application
NRM 123.2004 Margaretha BREIL, Anita FASSIO, Carlo GIUPPONI and Paolo ROSATO: Evaluation of Urban Improvement
on the Islands of the Venice Lagoon: A Spatially-Distributed Hedonic-Hierarchical Approach
ETA 124.2004 Paul MENSINK: Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement Under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric
Information: The Differential Tax Revisited
NRM 125.2004 Mauro FABIANO, Gabriella CAMARSA, Rosanna DURSI, Roberta IVALDI, Valentina MARIN and Francesca
PALMISANI: Integrated Environmental Study for Beach Management:A Methodological Approach
PRA 126.2004 Irena GROSFELD and Iraj HASHI: The Emergence of Large Shareholders in Mass Privatized Firms: Evidence
from Poland and the Czech Republic
CCMP 127.2004 Maria
  BERRITTELLA, Andrea BIGANO, Roberto ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL:  A General Equilibrium
Analysis of Climate Change Impacts on Tourism
CCMP 128.2004 Reyer GERLAGH: A Climate-Change Policy Induced Shift from Innovations in Energy Production to Energy
Savings
NRM 129.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Innovation, and Growth
PRA 130.2004 Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Mara FACCIO: Reluctant Privatization
SIEV 131.2004 Riccardo SCARPA and Mara THIENE: Destination Choice Models for Rock Climbing in the Northeast Alps: A
Latent-Class Approach Based on Intensity of Participation
SIEV 132.2004 Riccardo SCARPA Kenneth G. WILLIS and Melinda ACUTT: Comparing Individual-Specific Benefit Estimates
for Public Goods: Finite Versus Continuous Mixing in Logit Models
IEM 133.2004 Santiago J. RUBIO: On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited
ETA 134.2004 Ascensión ANDINA DÍAZ: Political Competition when Media Create Candidates’ Charisma
SIEV 135.2004 Anna ALBERINI: Robustness of VSL Values from Contingent Valuation Surveys
CCMP 136.2004 Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: Marginal Abatement Cost Curves in General Equilibrium: The
Influence of World Energy Prices
ETA 137.2004 Herbert DAWID, Christophe DEISSENBERG and Pavel ŠEVČIK: Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an
Environmental Taxation Game
CCMP 138.2004 ZhongXiang ZHANG: The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund and China
CCMP 139.2004 Reyer GERLAGH and Marjan W. HOFKES: Time Profile of Climate Change Stabilization Policy
NRM 140.2004 Chiara D’ALPAOS and Michele MORETTO: The Value of Flexibility in the Italian Water Service Sector: A
Real Option Analysis
PRA 141.2004 Patrick BAJARI, Stephanie HOUGHTON and Steven TADELIS (lxxi): Bidding for Incompete Contracts
PRA 142.2004 Susan ATHEY, Jonathan LEVIN and Enrique SEIRA (lxxi): Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory
and Evidence from Timber Auctions
PRA 143.2004 David GOLDREICH (lxxi): Behavioral Biases of Dealers in U.S. Treasury Auctions
PRA 144.2004 Roberto BURGUET (lxxi): Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More
Simple Economics
PRA 145.2004 Ali HORTACSU and Samita SAREEN (lxxi): Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: An Analysis of
Information and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions
PRA 146.2004 Victor GINSBURGH, Patrick LEGROS and Nicolas SAHUGUET (lxxi): How to Win Twice at an Auction. On
the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets
PRA 147.2004 Claudio MEZZETTI, Aleksandar PEKEČ and Ilia TSETLIN (lxxi): Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price
Auctions
PRA 148.2004 John ASKER and Estelle CANTILLON (lxxi): Equilibrium of Scoring Auctions
PRA 149.2004 Philip A. HAILE, Han HONG and Matthew SHUM (lxxi): Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-
Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
PRA 150.2004 François DEGEORGE, François DERRIEN and Kent L. WOMACK (lxxi): Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why
Bookbuilding is Dominating Auctions
CCMP 151.2004 Barbara BUCHNER and Silvia DALL’OLIO: Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and
Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol’s Adoption Process
CCMP 152.2004 Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Does Endogenous Technical Change Make a Difference in Climate
Policy Analysis? A Robustness Exercise with the FEEM-RICE Model
PRA 153.2004 Alejandro M. MANELLI and Daniel R. VINCENT (lxxi): Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue
Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly
ETA 154.2004 Nicola ACOCELLA, Giovanni Di BARTOLOMEO and Wilfried PAUWELS: Is there any Scope for Corporatism
in Stabilization Policies?
CTN 154.2004 Johan EYCKMANS  and Michael FINUS: An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with
Externalities
CCMP 156.2004 Cesare DOSI and Michele MORETTO: Environmental Innovation, War of Attrition and Investment GrantsCCMP 157.2004 Valentina BOSETTI, Marzio GALEOTTI and Alessandro LANZA: How Consistent are Alternative Short-Term
Climate Policies with Long-Term Goals?
ETA 158.2004 Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-Ichi AKAO: Non-pecuniary Value of Employment and Individual
Labor Supply
ETA 159.2004 William BROCK and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS:  Spatial Analysis: Development of Descriptive and Normative
Methods with Applications to Economic-Ecological Modelling
KTHC 160.2004 Alberto PETRUCCI: On the Incidence of a Tax on PureRent with Infinite Horizons
IEM 161.2004 Xavier LABANDEIRA, José M. LABEAGA and Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Microsimulating the Effects of Household
Energy Price Changes in Spain
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2005
CCMP 1.2005 Stéphane HALLEGATTE: Accounting for Extreme Events in the Economic Assessment of Climate Change
CCMP 2.2005 Qiang WU and Paulo Augusto NUNES: Application of Technological Control Measures on Vehicle Pollution: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis in China(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU,
Milan, September 25-27, 2003
(lxvi) This paper has been presented at the 4th BioEcon Workshop on “Economic Analysis of
Policies for Biodiversity Conservation” organised on behalf of the BIOECON Network by
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice International University (VIU) and University College
London (UCL) , Venice, August 28-29, 2003
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable
Economic Development – Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the
World Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003
(lxviii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Governance and Policies in
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The
Future of Climate Policy”, Cagliari, Italy, 27-28 March 2003
(lxx) This paper was presented at the 9
th Coalition Theory Workshop on "Collective Decisions and
Institutional Design" organised by the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and held in Barcelona,
Spain, January 30-31, 2004
(lxxi) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Consip and sponsored
by the EU, Rome, September 23-25, 20042004 SERIES
  CCMP Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )
  GG Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  SIEV Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)
  NRM Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
  KTHC Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)
  IEM International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya)
  CSRM Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti)
  PRA Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
  ETA Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  CTN Coalition Theory Network
2005 SERIES
  CCMP Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )
  SIEV Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)
  NRM Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
  KTHC Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)
  IEM International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya)
  CSRM Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti)
  PRCG Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
  ETA Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  CTN Coalition Theory Network